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A critical analysis of the transitional justice measures incorporated by 
Rwandan gacaca  and their effectiveness 
Judith Herrmann* 
 
I. Introduction 
During the 1994 Rwandan genocide approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus were killed, 
resulting in mass arrests and extensive criminal prosecution overwhelming an already devastated 
justice sector.1 To speed up genocide trials and reduce prison population the government launched 
approximately 11,000 local community courts, referred to as gacaca.2 These gacaca courts were 
meant to deal with ‘less serious’ genocide related crimes,3 combining prosecution with national 
unity and reconciliation.4 
Gacaca is often referred to as Rwanda’s answer to demands of transitional justice.5 Waldorf 
describes gacaca as ‘the most ambitious transitional justice measure ever attempted’.6 
Nevertheless, he argues that it almost exclusively focuses on accountability for the 1994 genocide, 
whilst neglecting other instruments of transitional justice.
7
 The International Center of Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ) holds that in order to be effective, transitional justice needs to include several 
measures that complement one another.8 This is supported by Boraine and Valentine who introduce 
a ‘holistic approach to transitional justice’, combining retributive justice with restorative justice.9 
After clarifying the term “transitional justice” and introducing the characteristics of gacaca, this 
essay is seeking to analyse whether gacaca represents a holistic approach by firstly determining the 
range of transitional justice instruments incorporated by gacaca and secondly by assessing their 
effectiveness. 
II. Transitional Justice 
                                                 
 
*Lecturer in the Conflict Management and Resolution Program at James Cook University (JCU).  
1 Lars Waldorf, 'Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda' 2009 The International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) <, 19. 
2 Ibid 20. 
3 Mark R Amstutz, 'Is Reconciliation Possible After Genocide?: The Case of Rwanda' (2006) 48.3 Journal of 
Church and State 541, 542. 
4 Olivia Ward, 'Flawed Rwandan courts diminish hope for justice', The Star (online), 2009  
<http://www.ictj.org/en/news/coverage/article/2507.html>. 
5 Phil Clark, 'Hybridity, Holism, and "Traditional" Justice: The Case of the gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda' (2007) 39.4 The George Washington International Law Review 765. 
6 Waldorf, above n 1, 4. 
7 Ibid 16. 
8 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), What is Transitional Justice? (2008) 
<http://www.ictj.org/static/Factsheets/ICTJ_TJ_fs2009.pdf> 
9 Alex Boraine and Sue Valentine, 'Defining Transitional Justice: Tolerance in the search for justice and 
peace' in Alex Boraine and Sue Valentine (eds), Transitional Justice and Human Security (International 
Center for Transitional Justice, 2006). 
 2 
 
Boraine and Valentine acknowledge that the term transitional justice is not easily defined.10 
Bickford suggests understanding the term as ‘justice during transition’, rather than a form of 
altered justice.
11
 He defines it as “a field of activity and inquiry focused on how societies address 
legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, 
including genocide or civil war in order to build a more democratic, just or peaceful future”.12 It is 
thus assumed that transitional justice consists of a combination of certain instruments and 
processes with the aim of achieving a range of goals relating to democracy, justice and peace. The 
following evaluation of gacaca as a transitional justice project will distinguish between measures 
and objectives of transitional justice.  
Similar to Bickford’s definition of the objectives of transitional justice, the ICTJ describes the 
purpose of a holistic approach to transitional justice as ‘the recognition of victims and the 
promotion of peace, reconciliation and democracy’.13 These objectives will serve as a guideline for 
the analysis of gacaca’s achievements. 
Clark explains how within a holistic approach to transitional justice multiple political, social, and 
legal institutions work together and complement each other, contributing ‘more effectively to the 
reconstruction of the entire society than a single institution’.14 The ICTJ further claims that a 
holistic approach requires the consideration of ‘the full range of factors that may have contributed 
to abuse’ including sensitivity to gender issues in personal, family, and social relations.15 This will 
also be considered when analysing the effectiveness of gacaca. 
Boraine and Valentine explain how countries undergoing transition need to combine judicial 
measures to re-establish the rule of law with the rebuilding of societies to enhance reconciliation.16 
They determine accountability, truth recovery, reconciliation, reparations, and institutional reform 
as the five key pillars of a holistic approach.17  
This essay will assess which of these five initiatives are taken into account by the gacaca court 
system and will then analyse in how far gacaca manages to achieve the purpose of transitional 
justice as defined by ICTJ (see above).18  
III. Gacaca Courts 
                                                 
10 Ibid.  
11 Louis Bickford, 'Transitional Justice' in The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity 
(Macmillan Reference USA, 2004). 
12 Ibid. 
13 ICTJ, above n 8. 
14 Clark, above n 5, 765. 
15 ICTJ, above n 8. 
16 Boraine and Valentine, above n 9. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See ICTJ, above n 8. 
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A. Background 
Following the end of the 1994 genocide, tens of thousands of suspects were arrested and accused 
of participating in the atrocities.19 Crimes were divided into four categories.20 Category 1 suspects 
including mass murders, rapists and persons who helped plan and execute the genocide were 
initially allocated to Rwanda’s conventional courts.21 Category 
2-4 included people 
 whose criminal acts or participation caused death (category 2) 
 who were guilty of other serious assault (category 3) 
 who committed an offense against someone’s property (category 4).22 
The presumed leadership accused of the most serious violations of international humanitarian law 
was prosecuted by the UN-backed International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).23 The 
ICTR was dealing with a vanishingly small number of accused, about 70, while Rwanda’s national 
courts were left with a myriad of genocide suspects.24 By 1998 Rwanda’s prisons, designed for 
about 12,000 detainees, were bursting with around 130,000 suspects.25 As Rwanda’s national 
courts had only managed to try around 1300 suspects between 1996 and 1998, it was estimated that 
genocide trials would continue for about 200 years if dealt with at the same pace by the 
conventional courts.26  
Responding to the enormous administrative and judicial challenge, Rwanda’s government chose 
gacaca to try category 2-4accused.27 In 2002 gacaca courts started as a pilot project, and in July 
2006, trials began throughout the country.28 As gacaca moved at a much faster pace than the 
conventional courts, most of the remaining “category 1” cases including at least 8000 rape and 
sexual violence cases, were transferred to gacaca in 2008.29 On the 18th June 2012, one decade 
                                                 
19 Leslie Haskell, 'Justice Compromised - The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts' 
Human Rights Watch, 2011. 
20 Maya Sosnov, 'The Adjudication of Genocide: gacaca and the Road to Reconciliation in Rwanda ' (2008) 
36. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 125, 131.  
21 Haskell, above n 18. 
22 For a more detailed description of the categories see appendix 1. 
23 Amstutz,  above n 3, 552. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Haskell, above n 19. 
26 Sarah L. Wells, 'Gender, Sexual Violence and Prospects for Justice at the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda' 
(2005) 167. California Law Review & Women's Studies 179. See also Haskell, above n 19. 
27 Haskell, above n 19. 
28 Allison Corey and Sandra F. Joireman, 'Retributive Justice: The gacaca Courts In Rwanda' (2004) 103. 
African Affairs 73, 83. See also Waldorf, above n 1, 20. 
29 IRIN, RWANDA: Rape, justice and privacy (2011) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=92876>. 
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after its launch, the gacaca jurisdiction was formally closed, having tried more than 1.9 million 
suspects during its ten years of existence.30 
B. Characteristics and Objectives of gacaca 
When gacaca was launched as a pilot project in 2002 Vice-President Kagame introduced five core 
objectives of gacaca:31 
 Reveal the truth 
 Accelerate genocide trials 
 Eradicate the culture of impunity 
 Reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity 
 Prove that Rwandans has the capacity to resolve their own problems 
The name gacaca means grass and refers to the place where dispute resolution traditionally took 
place.32 Gacaca was meant to join ‘local conflict resolution traditions with a modern punitive legal 
system’.33 The Rwandan government chose gacaca as it was thought to be “quick and informal”.34 
Furthermore, gacaca’s participatory and communal structure – gacaca courts depend on 
participation of local populations as judges, witnesses, parties and representatives –  was thought to 
enable both the delivery of justice and the promotion of reconciliation.35 
Wojkowska acknowledges that the community courts adopted some of the core aims of the 
traditional gacaca.36 Nevertheless, she mentions that according to some observers the modern 
proceedings are significantly different from the former customary courts.37 Traditional gacaca was 
used for minor civil disputes such as property and inheritance relations, while modern gacaca has 
been dealing with the prosecution of lower-level genocide suspects.38 In the past gacaca judges 
were community elders, whereas genocide gacaca judges were comparatively young elected 
community members.
39
 Furthermore, genocide gacaca represented a hierarchical state-
directed initiative applying codified rather than customary law.
40
 
                                                 
30 Survivors Fund (SURF) & REDRESS, 'Survivors' concerns over imminent closure of gacaca courts need 
to be addressed' (Press Release, 15th June 2012), www.redress.org/downloads/Gacaca-PressReleaseFinal-
150612.pdf>. 
31 Paul Kagame, as cited in Haskell, above n 19. 
32 Waldorf, above n 1, 34 n 131. 
33 Haskell, above n 19. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See Wells,  above n 26. 
36Ewa Wojkowska, 'Doing Justice: How informal justice systems can contribute' United Nations 
Development Programme, Oslo Governance Centre, Oslo, 2006, 27. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Waldorf, above n 1. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Wojkowska,  above n 36. 
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Choosing gacaca to process the majority of genocide suspects, the Rwandan government had to 
make a number of compromises, especially regarding the rights of the accused, qualifications of 
gacaca staff and applicable legal standards.
41
 It was believed that the transparency of the process 
and the participation of the community would legitimise the process and protect the rights of all 
participants.42 
C. Gacaca and the five Key Pillars of a Holistic Approach 
(a) Accountability 
Rwandan genocide survivors have emphasised the need for punishment of genocidaires for their 
crimes.43 This is supported by Boraine and Valentine who argue that it is of central importance to 
punish those who violated the law ‘as far as possible’.44  
Rwanda has demonstrated a commitment to hold accountable everyone suspected of having 
contributed to the genocide, deriving from the understanding that there is a legal duty to 
prosecute.45 Legal prosecution has the main objective of punishing those who have committed 
human rights violations and deterring future perpetrators.46 According to Bickford the creation of 
ad hoc tribunals enhanced jurisprudence in transitional justice and achieved some visible victories 
for accountability.47  
Since its launch in 2002 over 1.9 million cases have been processed under gacaca jurisdiction.48 In 
comparison, the conventional courts only tried 222 cases between January 2005 and March 2008.49 
Genocide trials held by the ICTR have proceeded even more slowly – since its creation in 1994 72 
cases have been completed of which ten resulted in acquittal and 17 are on appeal.50 One case is 
still in progress.51 
(a) Truth Recovery 
                                                 
41 Haskell, above n 19. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Clark, above n 5. 
44 Boraine and Valentine, above n 9, 95. 
45 William A. Schabas, 'Genocide Trials and gacaca Courts' (2005) 3. Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 1, 4. 
46 Clark, above n 5. 
47 Bickford, above n 11. 
48United Nations Development Programme Communications Office, 'Closure of gacaca' 
2012http://www.undp.org.rw/Article-on-Gacaca_AL-13-June-2012_NB.pdf>. 
49 Haskell, above n 19. 
50Internaltional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Status of Cases (2012) 
<http://www.unictr.org/Cases/StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx>. The numbers provided above have last 
been updated on 21/07/2012. 
51 Ibid. 
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The Rwandan government rejected the idea of a truth commission.52 The participatory nature of 
gacaca, allowing Tutsis and Hutus to speak in public to either support an accusation or to defend 
an accused, was supposed to enable the uncovering of the truth.
53
 Amstutz explains how truth 
telling was further fostered by plea bargaining.54 Plea bargaining was a unique approach of gacaca 
aiming at encouraging offenders to confess in exchange for substantially reduced sentences.55 In 
gacaca, most perpetrators confessing to their crimes were eligible to serve half their sentence 
doing community service.56 A confession had to comprise a complete and detailed description of 
the offences that the accused committed, including information about accomplices and any other 
relevant fact.57  
(b) Reconciliation 
Broad local participation in gacaca was meant to promote reconciliation by empowering 
communities to solve their problems themselves, in a manner consistent with Rwandan tradition.58 
Wells describes how gacaca was supposed to restore the social fabric of villages destroyed during 
the genocide by “bringing people together and making them responsible for the achievement of 
justice in their communities”.59  
Genocide accused were tried by gacaca courts located in the community where they allegedly 
committed the crimes to enhance reconciliation amongst victims and perpetrators.60 Gacaca was 
meant to provide a platform for both Tutsis and Hutus to speak publicly with the objective of 
unearthing the truth and creating a shared account of the events to foster reconciliation.61 By 
granting leniency to those who admitted guilt and expressed remorse, the concept of plea 
bargaining was meant to foster reconciliation between survivors and suspects.62 One popular form 
of punishment during gacaca was community service instead of imprisonment with the aim to 
restore perpetrators and reintegrate them into the community.63  This again was meant to support 
the overall reconciliation process.64 
(c) Reparations 
                                                 
52 Lars Waldorf, 'ICTJ Research Brief - Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda' International 
Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, 3. 
53 Amstutz,  above n 3. 
54 Ibid 552. 
55 Schabas,  above n 45, 7. 
56 Waldorf, above n 1. See appendix 2 for the Gacaca Sentencing Scheme. 
57 Schabas,  above n 45, 7. 
58 Wells, above n 26. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Amstutz,  above n 3, 548. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See ibid 556. 
64 Ibid. 
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Waldorf argues that the gacaca court system has provided limited reparations to genocide 
survivors.65 Gacaca offered symbolic reparations: in order to benefit from reduced sentences, those 
who pleaded guilty had to reveal the whereabouts of their victims’ remains before they were 
eligible for reduced sentences.66 Some of the most local-level gacaca courts awarded restitution to 
genocide survivors for their loss of property.67 If convicted perpetrators were unable to reimburse 
victims for stolen or destroyed property, some were required to work off their debts through unpaid 
labour.68  
Haskell claims that gacaca did not provide any monetary compensation for survivors who lost 
relatives during the genocide or who were injured or raped.69 This is supported by Schurr, legal 
advisor of the human rights organisation REDRESS, who talks about ‘the lack of compensation for 
moral and bodily damage for survivors of genocide’.70 According to the human rights organisations 
Survivors Fund (SURF) and REDRESS, “thousands of compensation and /or restitution awards” 
were granted by gacaca courts.71 However, it seems that many of them have not been enforced yet 
and it is unclear how they will be handled following the closure of the gacaca jurisdiction.72  
(d) Institutional Reform 
Waldorf explains that institutional reform was not a main concern of the Rwandan post-genocide 
government as most of those associated with the former Hutu government had left the country 
towards the end of the genocide.73 However, gacaca’s approach to institutional transformation 
might be revealed in the participatory nature and local ownership of gacaca, as well as the 
integration of Rwanda’s traditional dispute resolution system.74 
IV. Achievements of gacaca in the light of a holistic approach to traditional justice  
According to Waldorf gacaca was generally supposed to accomplish a number of ambitious goals: 
unearth the truth, punish genocidaires and reconcile communities.75 He holds that gacaca so far 
has not lived up to the expectations placed upon it, although he acknowledges that ‘the Rwandan 
government has accomplished the extraordinary feat of providing security and rebuilding the 
                                                 
65 Waldorf, above n 52, 4. 
66 Waldorf, above n 1. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Haskell, above n 19. 
70 Schurr as cited in Survivors Fund (SURF) & REDRESS, above n 30. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Waldorf, above n 1, 16. 
74 See, eg, Wendy Lambourne, 'Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence' (2009) 3.1 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 28. 
75 Waldorf, above n 52, 20. 
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country’76 There is consensus that gacaca managed to reduce prison population and process cases 
much faster than the conventional court system.77 Furthermore it led to the release of some of those 
who had been falsely accused, which has supported the re-building of Rwanda and its society.
78
 
That said, opinions seem to differ as to whether gacaca was able to eradicate the pre-existing 
culture of impunity and if it will play a role in deterring future violence.79  
As mentioned above, ICTJ identifies the recognition of victims and the promotion of peace, 
democracy and reconciliation as the main purpose of transitional justice.80 The following part of 
this article will discuss how effectively gacaca has achieved these objectives.  
A. Peace  
To foster peace and security, Lambourne suggests the incorporation of both retributive and 
restorative justice into accountability mechanisms.81 Although the Rwandan government 
considered retributive justice as crucial to end the culture of impunity, which according to them led 
to the 1994 genocide,82 gacaca was introduced with the explicit objective of combining retributive 
and restorative elements.83 Amstutz describes how gacaca pursued restorative justice both through 
its process and its outcomes.84 He explains how the active engagement of the community through 
negotiation and collaboration during gacaca hearings and the concept of plea bargaining resembled 
restorative processes.85 Community service and compensation as punishment further highlight 
gacaca’s pursuit of restorative justice.86 Others hold that modern gacaca lost its restorative 
character, resembling a formal, retributive legal system.87 
B. Democracy 
The community based nature and local ownership of gacaca suggests that the Rwandan 
government was trying to promote community participation and empowerment, which are concepts 
closely related to democracy.88 Haskell argues that gacaca’s participatory concept was 
compromised by the prevailing political climate in Rwanda and restrictions on free speech.89 The 
                                                 
76 Waldorf, above n 1, 15. 
77 Haskell, above n 19. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 ICTJ, above n 8. 
81 Lambourne,  above n 74. 
82 Waldorf, 'Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda’, above n 1, 19. 
83 Lambourne,  above n 74, 39. 
84 Amstutz,  above n 3, 556-7. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 See, eg, Lambourne, above n 74. 
88 Jay Drydyk, Participation, Empowerment, and Democracy: Three Fickle Friends (n.d.) Ethics of 
Empowerment<http://www.ethicsofempowerment.org/papers/DrydykGouletFest.pdf>. 
89 Haskell, above n 19. 
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Rwandan government launched a campaign against “divisionism” and ‘genocide ideology’ which 
had ‘a chilling effect on Rwandans’ ability and willingness to express themselves’.90 Haskell 
explains how many felt unable to speak freely about their genocide experience and refrained from 
publicly defending genocide suspects in fear of being accused of perjury or complicity.91 
Lambourne criticises Rwanda’s lack of democratisation and the perception of victor’s justice 
deriving from the official designation that in gacaca genocide survivors were always Tutsis while 
all perpetrators were Hutus.92  
C. Reconciliation 
Opinions amongst survivors and perpetrators differ largely regarding gacaca’s impact on 
reconciliation. Some survivors mentioned that following gacaca they were able again to greet their 
neighbours who had been involved in the events of 1994.93 Others regarded these encounters as 
superficial and found tensions and distrust between victims and perpetrators to remain.94  
Haskell acknowledges that gacaca 'may have placed Rwandans on the path to reconciliation, at 
least superficially,’ but argues that 17 years after the genocide Rwandan communities were still 
characterized by distrust between the two main ethnic groups and that gacaca has reinforced ethnic 
division.95 Schabas suggests that a focus on legal prosecution may have hampered reconciliation 
and closure.96 In contrast, Clark explains how gacaca courts achieved legal outcomes whilst 
fostering the restoration of fractured individual and communal relationships,97 which according to 
Lederach should be the focus of any reconciliation process.98 
D. Reconciliation and Forgiveness 
According to Mellor, Bretheron and Firth reconciliation requires both an apology and 
forgiveness.99 Gacaca’s concept of plea bargaining was meant to encourage perpetrators to confess 
and to enable forgiveness.100 Amstutz explains how many Rwandan victims expressed willingness 
to forgive perpetrators who admitted culpability and expressed regret for their crimes.101 However, 
                                                 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Lambourne,  above n 74, 44. 
93 Haskell, above n 19. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Schabas,  above n 45, 3-4. 
97 Clark,  above n 5. 
98 John Paul Lederach, Building peace : sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1997). 
99 David Mellor, Di Bretherton and Lucy Firth, 'Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Australia: The Dilemma of 
Apologies, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation' (2007) 13.1 Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 
11, 11. 
100 Haskell, above n 19. 
101 Amstutz,  above n 3, 559. 
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genocide survivors have criticised the lack of remorse on the part of the perpetrators, explaining 
that gacaca encouraged confessions primarily to reduce prison sentences.102 Lambourne further 
explains that the continuous denial of responsibility on the part of the perpetrators has caused 
difficulties for Rwanda’s reconciliation process.103 Some survivors stated that they felt forced to 
publicly forgive those who had wronged them although they were not yet ready to forgive.104 Clark 
explains that it will take many survivors a long time to overcome their feelings of distrust and 
resentment towards suspects, which is crucial to enable the rebuilding of relationships.105 
E. Reconciliation and Reparations 
The lack of reparations for survivors who lost relatives during the genocide or who were injured or 
raped has enhanced bitterness on the part of the genocide survivors.106 This suggests that gacaca 
has not been able to provide sufficient recognition for victims. Lambourne argues that the lack of 
compensation left many survivors to live in poverty, and that Rwandans’ inability to meet basic 
needs significantly complicates reconciliation and peace.107 It seems that if material needs were 
met by compensations, people would be more able to reconcile.108 This is supported by Bloomfield 
who regards reparations as one main instrument of reconciliation.109 The lack of reparations also 
had a negative impact on the number of participants in gacaca trials as there was little incentive for 
genocide survivors to attend.110 
F. Reconciliation, Procedural Fairness and Human Rights 
Another reconciliation measure defined by Bloomfield is a ‘justice reform that is built on human 
rights principles, democratic practices, and international legal norms, and that promises fairness in 
the future’.111 Although accountability is one of the core achievements of gacaca, it also appears to 
be one of the most criticised initiatives of Rwanda’s approach to transitional justice.  
Perpetrators and external observers have criticised the shortcomings of gacaca relating to 
procedural fairness and human rights.112 Ward argues that gacaca was meant to try minor disputes 
and is not capable of dealing with genocide crimes in an appropriate manner.113 Indeed, the 
                                                 
102 Haskell, above n 19. 
103 Lambourne,  above n 74, 41. 
104 Haskell, above n 19. 
105 Clark,  above n 5. 
106 Haskell, above n 19. 
107 Lambourne,  above n 74, 42. 
108 Ibid, citing a statement made by a Rwandan interviewee. 
109 D. Bloomfield, 'On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation (Berghof Report No. 14)' Berghof Research 
Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, Germany, 2006. 
110 Haskell, above n 19. 
111 Bloomfield, above n 109, 12. 
112 Haskell, above n 19. 
113 Ward, above n 4. 
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standards of justice of the gacaca courts differed largely from those of the international court 
system.114 According to Haskell the gacaca courts were seriously flawed by any international 
standard and were unable to guarantee a fair trial for numerous reasons.
115
 One major argument 
against gacaca is that suspects did not have legal support and were unable to prepare an adequate 
defence.116 Clark explains how the exclusion of lawyers was meant to have a positive impact on 
reconciliation by maximising ‘the community’s sense of ownership over the process’.117  
Most of the gacaca judges had insufficient formal training.118 They did not receive any 
compensation and some were reported to have been susceptible to bribery and manipulations of 
trials and verdicts.119 Although gacaca law required judges to be ‘Rwandans of integrity’ with 
‘high morals and conduct’, critics often questioned their impartiality because judges came from the 
same community as the accused and were thus directly affected by the incidents.120 In contrast, 
Clark regards the close ties of judges with their community as an important adoption from 
traditional gacaca legitimising the modern proceedings.121 
According to Haskell only few survivors thought that the sentences delivered within the gacaca 
processes matched the crimes committed against them or their families.122 Furthermore, gacaca 
was unable to provide adequate protection for witnesses, which prevented many speaking in 
public.123 According to Ward, some witnesses were attacked and killed while others fled their 
homes in fear of violent reprisal.124 The public nature of gacaca prevented many women from 
reporting and discussing cases of sexual violence in gacaca. This issue will be further discussed 
below.  
The government’s argument ‘that popular involvement was ensuring fair trials’ was weakened by 
low levels of community participation.125 Waldorf explains how genocide survivors were reluctant 
to incriminate their Hutu neighbours and discuss their traumatic experience in public as they feared 
retaliation and had low prospects of adequate compensation.126 
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
115 Haskell, above n 19. 
116 Ward, above n 4. See also IRIN, above n 29. 
117 Clark,  above n 5, 796. 
118 Ward, above n 4. 
119 See Haskell, above n 19. See also Sosnov,  above n 20. See also Ward, above n 4.  
120 See Sosnov,  above n 20, 148. 
121 Clark,  above n 5. 
122 Haskell, above n 19. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ward, above n 4. 
125 Haskell, above n 19. 
126 Waldorf, above n 1, 21. 
 12 
 
At the same time Hutus were hesitant to participate and challenge false testimony because they 
feared to be accused either as perpetrators or bystanders.127 Hutus were not given an opportunity to 
discuss their own losses and seek justice, as gacaca only focused on accountability for the 1994 
genocide while neglecting war crimes committed by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces or 
revenge killings against Hutu civilians in 1994.128 This one-sided approach to accountability 
caused great frustration and bitterness for many Hutus and further widened the gap between Hutus 
and Tutsis, impeding reconciliation. 
These procedural weaknesses of gacaca seem to have jeopardised peace and security in Rwanda.129 
A significant number of those people being interviewed for the 2011 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
report voiced concerns about retaliatory actions and renewed violence, suggesting that current 
peace in Rwanda is perceived by many as fragile.130 
G. Reconciliation and Truth Recovery 
Bloomfield regards truth recovery and healing as crucial components of reconciliation. Haskell 
acknowledges that at times gacaca supported the uncovering of the truth.131 He explains how the 
majority of people who participated in gacaca agree that they learned some valuable information 
about the events of 1994.132 Survivors especially appreciated finding out about the whereabouts of 
their loved ones so that they could find their remains and bury them in dignity.133  
Others raise criticism that not all of the truth has been revealed during gacaca due to partial 
confessions and false accusations or testimonies.134 Lambourne argues that many survivors are still 
unable to find out what happened to their loved ones.135 She further explains how a ‘eal dialogue or 
engagement in gaining a sense of “social truth”’ is lacking.136 Gacaca’s truth-revealing potential 
was also limited by waning interest of the majority of the population to participate in the trials and 
by the silence of those who attended but refrained from speaking in public.137 Women were 
especially reluctant to raise their voices in the public arena, compromising the development of a 
shared or public truth around the 1994 atrocities.138 Lambourne concludes that for the above 
                                                 
127 Ibid 20-1; Haskell, above n 19. 
128 Waldorf, above n 1, 16. 
129 Haskell, above n 19. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Lambourne,  above n 74. 
136 Ibid 41. 
137 Haskell, above n 19. 
138 Wells,  above n 26. 
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reasons genocide gacaca was failing to enhance healing or restorative truth, impeding 
reconciliation amongst the Rwandan society.139 
H. Reconciliation and Co-existence 
According to the 2011 HRW report, more people considered gacaca to have increased tensions 
between Hutus and Tutsi than believed in its reconciliatory deals.140  Haskell concludes that 
reconciliation in Rwandan communities can be defined as co-existence rather than ‘genuine 
forgiveness that comes from the hearts of genocide victims’.141  
Bloomfield claims that the reconciliatory potential of co-existence should not be underestimated, 
as peaceful coexistence constitutes a start towards reconciliation.142 He explains how, for former 
enemies, fewer negative implications are related to the concept of coexistence than reconciliation, 
as co-existence does not require forgiveness, which may be particularly difficult after genocide.143 
Borneman states that ‘the profound loss suffered in an ethnic cleansing ... is never fully 
recoupable’ exacerbating issues with forgiveness and the associated reconciliation.144 Coexistence 
may have the potential to create the necessary framework to allow forgiveness to develop at a later 
stage.145 
V. Gender Issues 
Experiences of Rwandan women, both during and since the genocide, seem to differ markedly 
from those of Rwandan men.146 Rombouts explains how women were not very involved in 
conceiving Rwanda’s transitional justice mechanisms.147  
Initially, rape and sexual violence were classified as crimes of category 1 and were dealt with by 
the national court, although women were theoretically allowed to raise their claims during 
gacaca.148 Due to shame, social stigmatisation, and psychological trauma Rwandan women were 
very reluctant to discuss their experiences during a public gacaca hearing.149 Thus the transfer of 
rape cases from conventional courts to gacaca in 2008 caused significant difficulties for victims of 
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sexual violence, seriously compromising their privacy.150 The Rwandan government reacted by 
putting in place safeguards to enable confidentiality for rape victims, allowing them to report cases 
in private meetings with gacaca staff.
151
 However, even though testimonies of rape cases were 
recorded behind closed doors, victims still feared that their identities would be revealed to their 
community.152 Haskell describes how trials were often held near administrative offices or schools 
and women entering a room to report rape or sexual violence could easily be seen by third 
parties.153  
The genocide's immense death toll among the men left many women as widows, often with few 
essential resources.154 At that time, Rwanda’s inheritance rules did not usually allow women to 
access their husband’s or father’s property.155 An inferior public position, and low levels of literacy 
and education also contributed to women’s vulnerability.156 This may have restrained female 
participation in gacaca as vulnerable women can be assumed to be susceptible to community 
pressures including forces against discussing ‘shameful’ violations in public or identifying oneself 
as a victim of sexual assault.157 This suggests that community courts were not the right platform to 
encourage women to report rape and other form of sexual violence, and were thus unable to 
provide justice to many women. According to Wells today many female survivors suffer primarily 
from a lack of financial and psychological support, suggesting that women have been impacted 
especially severely by the lack of reparations provided by the gacaca system.158 
It should be mentioned that until recently sexual violence was not regarded as a violation of 
international humanitarian legal norms and rape was not treated as a grave breach.159 By 
characterizing rape and sexual violence as a form of genocide and as a category 1 crime, the ICTR 
and Rwandan National Court largely contributed to an alteration of gender violence under 
international law.160 Nevertheless, Franke argues that although the ICTR established that sexual 
violence could constitute a form of genocide, it has done little to follow it up in terms of 
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prosecuting and – along with other process related shortcomings – has been largely criticised for 
not investigating rape and sexual violence.161 
Despite gacaca’s shortcomings in regards to gender issues it shall be mentioned that in recent 
years Rwanda seems to have made significant progress advancing women’s rights and roles.162 
According to Nyirasafali, national programme officer for the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), ‘there used to be a lot of rapes, wife beating, male domination of women, boys sent to 
school and not girls [but] that has all changed, even in the countryside’.163 Boseley explains how 
Rwandan women now ‘have the right to own land and property’.164  
VI. Suggestions on how to complement gacaca as a Holistic Approach to Transitional 
Justice 
Although accountability is one of the main achievements of gacaca, it appears that an 
improvement in the procedural shortcomings would have enhanced the objectives of transitional 
justice. Haskell suggests that certain fundamental rights should have been better protected, such as 
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges in adequate time to prepare a defence or the 
right to have a lawyer.165 He also criticises the insufficient training of gacaca court personnel and 
argues that ‘a stronger and more robust legal framework was needed to ensure judges’ impartiality 
and to insist upon reasoned and fact-based judgments’.166  
According to Lambourne transitional justice must incorporate the transformation of political 
institutions and socioeconomic distribution.167 Unfortunately, it is widely accepted that gacaca was 
not very successful in enhancing either aspect, as Rwanda continued to face enormous political and 
economic challenges.168 To promote broad and active community participation and thus enable 
fairness of the process and truth recovery gacaca should have been complemented by further 
political reform. 
As explained above, gacaca failed to provide adequate compensation for the loss of relatives or 
personal injury, although reparations have been identified as one critical element of transitional 
justice and reconciliation.169 Monetary assistance has been determined as particularly important 
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for female genocide survivors, suggesting that it would have been crucial to complement gacaca 
with an effective form of restitution.  Waldorf argues that the Rwandan government had initially 
planned on establishing the Compensation Fund for Victims of the Genocide and Crimes against 
Humanity, but failed to do so.170 It shall be mentioned that according to Mary Kavitesi Blewitt, 
founder and former director of the UK registered charity SURF, Rwandan Government dedicates 
five percent of its budget for educational and healthcare needs of genocide survivors.171 However, 
Blewitt also emphasises that this money constitutes ‘the only other sustainable and significant 
funding for survivors’ besides SURF.172  
Wells argues that transitional justice needs to assist in eliminating the violence and discrimination 
women suffer in Rwandan society not only in conflict but also in peacetime.173 Although gacaca 
made some effort to demonstrate sensitivity towards gender issues, a range of significant changes 
to gacaca would have been crucial to enable women to achieve reconciliation. This could have 
included a better protection of privacy, the provision of financial and psychological support and 
institutional reforms to improve the general position of women in Rwandan society. As mentioned 
above, the position and rights of women in Rwanda seem to have changed significantly over the 
very last years, indicating that a number of institutional reforms have recently taken place. 
According to Boseley, in 2010 ‘women occupy some of the most important government ministries 
make up 56% of the country's parliamentarians’.174 
VII. Conclusion 
In the beginning of this essay a holistic approach to transitional justice is described in terms of its 
instruments and processes (five key pillars) and its purpose and objectives (as defined by ICTJ). It 
has been demonstrated that gacaca incorporated initiatives relating to all five key pillars 
(accountability, truth recovery, reconciliation, reparations and institutional reform) as determined 
by Boraine & Valentine. The main objectives of transitional justice have been defined as the 
recognition of victims and the promotion of peace, democracy and reconciliation. In-depth analysis 
suggests that gacaca has at times achieved some of these goals. However, it appears that there 
were opportunities to complement gacaca with additional measures in order to improve its purpose 
in terms of a holistic approach to transitional justice. 
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Considering the scale and brutality of the 1994 genocide, the task Rwanda’s government had to 
face was huge and involved an incredible number of perpetrators.175 Since 2002 nearly two million 
cases have been processed, preventing the collapse of Rwandan’s prisons and national court system 
and achieving Rwanda’s commitment to holding all perpetrators of the genocide accountable.  
Legal prosecution has been identified as an important means of transitional justice. However, the 
gacaca court system has been criticised for a number of shortcomings and it appears that some 
improvements could have increased gacaca’s validity and overall success.  
There is also suggestion that an effective form of reparations for genocide survivors would have 
assisted in meeting their basic needs and would have demonstrated recognition of victims, 
ultimately assisting the peace and reconciliation process. A more comprehensive institutional 
reform would have been necessary to support both victims and perpetrators to overcome their 
concerns and to actively participate in gacaca, enabling the recovery of truth and ultimately 
reconciliation. The gacaca system has achieved a great deal of positive change in Rwandan society 
since the atrocities of 1994. But it appears that there were opportunities for improvement to assist 
Rwanda in moving towards a reconciled, more democratic society that is free from the often cited 
culture of impunity.176 
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VIII. Appendix  
Appendix 1  
Rwanda’s ORGANIC LAW - No. 08/96 of August 30,1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions 
for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since 
October 1, 1990 CHAPTER II – CATEGORIZATION, Article 2 . 
Persons accused of offences set out in Article 1 of this organic law and committed   during the 
period between 1 October 1990 and 1994 shall, on the basis of their acts   of participation, be 
classified into one of the following categories:  
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Category 1:  
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among the 
planners, organisers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of Genocide or of a crime 
against humanity. 
 
persons who acted in positions of authority at the National, Prefectorial, Communal, Sector or Cell 
level, or in a political party, the army, religious organizations or in a militia and who perpetrated or 
fostered such crimes. 
 
notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed 
atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they passed. 
 
persons who committed acts of sexual torture or violence. 
Category 2: 
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among perpetrators, 
conspirators of accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault against the person causing 
death;  
Category 3: 
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of other 
serious assaults against the person;  
Category 4:  
persons who committed offences against property.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Source: Clarke, 2007. 
 
